Permanent demand excess as business strategy: an analysis of the Brazilian higher-education market  by Moita, Rodrigo Menon Simões et al.
ISSN 0080-2107
R.Adm., São Paulo, v.50, n.1, p.9-25, jan./fev./mar. 2015 9
Recebido em 13/dezembro/2011
Aprovado em 11/novembro/2014
Sistema de Avaliação: Double Blind Review
Editor Científico: Nicolau Reinhard
DOI: 10.5700/rausp1181
R
E
S
U
M
O
Rodrigo Menon Simões Moita, Mestre em Economia 
pela Universidade de São Paulo, Doutor em 
Economia pela Universidade de Illinois em Urbana- 
-Champaign (Estados Unidos), é Professor do 
Insper (CEP 04546-042 – São Paulo/SP, Brasil).
E-mail: rodrigomsm@insper.edu.br
Endereço:
Insper
Rua Quatá, 300 – Sala 418
04546-042 – São Paulo – SP
Carlos Eduardo Lobo e Silva, Economista pela 
Universidade de São Paulo, Mestre em Economia 
Aplicada pela Universidade de São Paulo e Ph.D. 
em Planejamento Regional pela Universidade de 
Illinois em Urbana-Champaign, é Professor da 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do 
Sul (CEP 90619-900 – Porto Alegre/RS, Brasil).
E-mail: carlos.silva@pucrs.br
Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade, Bacharel e Mestre 
em Economia pela Pontifícia Universidade 
Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Ph.D. em Economia  
pela Universidade de Chicago, é Economista e 
Sócio da Apex Capital Ltda. (CEP 04547-004 –  
São Paulo/SP, Brasil).
E-mail: eduardo.andrade@apexcapital.com.br
Permanent demand excess as business 
strategy: an analysis of the Brazilian  
higher-education market
Rodrigo Menon Simões Moita 
Insper – São Paulo/SP, Brasil
Carlos Eduardo Lobo e Silva 
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul – Porto Alegre/RS, 
Brasil
Eduardo de Carvalho Andrade 
Apex Capital Ltda. – São Paulo/SP, Brasil
Excesso de demanda permanente como estratégia 
de mercado: uma análise do mercado brasileiro de 
ensino superior
Muitas Instituições de Ensino Superior (IES) precificam seus 
cursos abaixo do preço de equilíbrio para gerar excesso de 
demanda permanente. Neste artigo, primeiramente se adaptam 
as ideias de Becker (1991) para entender por que as IES pre-
cificam seus cursos dessa maneira. O fato de os alunos serem 
consumidores e insumos no processo de produção de educação 
gera um equilíbrio de mercado em que algumas firmas cobram 
preços elevados e têm excesso de demanda por suas vagas, e 
outras cobram um preço baixo e sobram vagas. Em seguida, 
analisa-se esse equilíbrio empiricamente. Estima-se a demanda 
por cursos de graduação em Administração no estado de São 
Paulo. Os resultados mostram que o preço, a qualidade dos alu-
nos ingressantes e a porcentagem de professores com doutorado 
são os fatores determinantes na escolha de um estudante. Dado 
que a qualidade dos estudantes determina a demanda por uma 
IES, calcula-se qual é o valor, para uma IES, de ter melhores 
estudantes. Esse valor é igual à receita de que ela abdica para 
manter excesso de demanda e seleção de alunos. Com respeito 
ao investimento em seleção de alunos, 39 IES no estado de 
São Paulo abdicaram de uma receita de aproximadamente R$ 
5 milhões por ano por turma de ingressantes, o que equivale a 
7,6% da receita de uma classe de ingressantes.
Palavras-chave: educação superior, segmentação de mercado,  
 
efeito dos pares.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Microeconomics manuals teach that, in equilibrium, the 
amount demanded for a good or service must equal the amount 
supplied. In the higher-education market, this principle does 
not hold. Instead, many higher-education institutions (HEIs) 
limit the number of available slots to guarantee permanent 
excess demand. The same phenomenon can be observed in 
other markets, especially service markets, but the rationale 
behind excess demand in higher education does not apply to 
restaurants or large events. In education, the student is not 
only the consumer, but also he or she is a factor of production. 
As consequence, the quality of the output is a function of 
the quality of the student body. For this reason, given the 
characteristics of HEI and the quantity of available slots, the 
institution charges tuition below equilibrium price to increase 
the quantity of appliers and, thus, to benefit from  greater 
selectivity.
The Brazilian market for HEIs is predominantly composed 
by private enterprises. Among 2.281 HEIs in 2006, 89% were 
private, and 74.6% of all students were enrolled in these private 
schools. Additionally, the majority of private HEIs (52%) are for 
profit (2006 Higher Education Census – Ministry of Education). 
Despite the lack of official data on the amount of donations 
received by HEIs, it is known that the resources derived from 
this source are limited, as are the resources available to fund 
research. In this context, most Brazilian private HEIs primarily 
raise funds from student tuition payments. Those are little 
known outside their area and, although they charge low tuitions, 
have empty slots. They coexist with some HEIs with good 
reputation, which charge high tuitions and have hotly disputed 
selection processes. Among private Business Administration 
schools in São Paulo in 2006, for example, the fees range from 
R$ 170 to R$ 2.250 (or from US$ 106 to US$ 1,415(1)), and the 
ratio of candidates to slots ranges from 0.17 to 11.5. 
The sector has been going through substantial transformation 
over the last years. There has been a large increase in the 
number of students enrolled in higher education: from 1.3 
million in 1995 to 3.8 million students in 2003 and 7.0 million in 
2012 (2012 Higher Education Census – Ministry of Education). 
Despite the consistent growth observed over the last decades, 
there has been a substantial slowdown in the growth rate. The 
number of enrolled students more than tripled from 1995 to 
2003, while it less than doubled from 2003 to 2012.
The players and their size have also changed. A fast 
consolidation process has taken place, with some large 
educational groups (Anhanguera, Estacio and Kroton, among 
others) buying local institutions. So, the observed trend 
nowadays is from a market with local and independent HEIs to a 
market dominated by large chains. Kroton and Anhanguera had 
11% of the Brazilian market in 2011, and 14% in 2012, which 
means a growth of 27% in one year. However, the majority 
of supply still comes from local and independent institutions.
This article analyzes the HEI market and attempts to answer 
four interrelated questions:
• How do we theoretically understand the existence of the HEI 
that opts for the strategy of maintaining permanent excess 
demand?
• Which HEIs’ characteristics affect the demand for their 
business courses?
• How big is the group of HEIs that really invest in selectivity?
• How much revenue does the HEI give up to increase the 
selectivity of its admissions process and, consequently, the 
quality of its students?
Through two adaptations of the ideas of Becker (1991), 
we attempt to explain why some HEIs maintain permanent 
excess demand while others do not. Next, using a database of 
business schools in the state of São Paulo(2) (see section 3 for 
a detailed description of the dataset) we estimate the demand 
for higher education. The empirical results show that the 
quality of the student body, the tuition, and the quality of the 
lecturers are relevant in determining the demand of the market. 
The relevance of the quality of the student body justifies the 
strategy of an HEI that opts for excess demand and confirms the 
theory that will be developed in the next section: demand for 
the school hinges on the quality of the students and, ultimately, 
responds positively to the selectivity imposed by the HEI. 
Finally, using the results of econometric models, we present 
the total “investment” in selectivity made by São Paulo HEIs 
in their business programs. This total, which surpasses R$ 5 
million (or US$ 3.14 million – 7.6% of the revenue) per year, 
can be understood as an investment in differentiation.
While Becker (1991) theoretically shows why some 
restaurants having long queues for tables do not raise prices, 
this paper estimates the “investment on queues”. The higher 
education market is specially appropriated for this study 
because there is data about all the candidates, including those 
students that failed in the selecting process. In a restaurant-
-market context, it would be as if we knew the numbers of 
clients and the number of people who give up eating at a given 
restaurant because of its long queues.
The selection of better students in higher education is well 
documented by literature, but how to measure its impact on the 
education output is a controversial question (see Winston & 
Zimmerman, 2003). Instead of measuring this effect, the focus 
of this work is to better understand how the existence of those 
effects modifies the market equilibrium. Thus, we estimate 
(a) on one side, how the selectivity of HEIs (considering the 
quality of incoming students as a proxy) affects the demand 
curve, and (b) on the other side, how much the HEIs invest in 
selectivity to maximize their long term profits by maintaining 
permanent excess demand.
There is a broad and well-established literature that studies 
the decision to pursue college education, with emphasis on 
the impact of tuition on college decision. An earlier study by 
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Bishop (1977) analyzes the decisions of high school students. 
He found that tuition has a more severe negative impact on 
lower income groups. Ehrenberg (2004) presents a review of 
this literature, corroborating the notion that a higher tuition 
and fewer financial incentives, such as scholarships, reduce the 
motivation to study at an HEI. Other characteristics that may 
affect student preferences are less studied. 
Another branch of this literature (Belzil & Hansen, 2002; 
Hartog & Diaz-Serrano, 2007; among others) analyzes higher 
education as an investment, and how earnings risk affects 
students’ choice. The results are not conclusive: Belzi and 
Hansen find a positive correlation between risk and the 
decision to attend college, while other authors find a negative 
relationship.
Four papers follow this line of research and are closely 
related to our study. Gallego and Hernando (2008) also use a 
discrete choice model in Chilean high schools to estimate the 
effects of the voucher system on student well-being and socio- 
-economic segregation. Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) use panel 
data to evaluate the impact on the demand for universities of 
the U.S. News and World Report rankings, the most traditional 
ranking in the U.S market. They conclude that a lower position 
in the ranking is detrimental to the university: fewer accepted 
students decide to enroll; the quality of new classes decreases, 
as measured by the admissions test; and the net tuition paid 
by the student is lower because the university has to be more 
generous in granting financial aid to attract students from the 
smaller group of applicants.
Long (2004) examines how different cohorts of students in 
the United States choose which HEI to attend based on their 
own characteristics and those of the HEI, such as tuition, quality 
of the student body, percentage of lecturers with doctorates and 
student/lecturer ratio. Long’s study concludes that the quality of 
the faculty is the most important factor in the student’s decision, 
a result we also find here.
Kelchtermans and Verboven (2009) study college choice 
in the Belgium region of Flandres. They conclude that courses 
are close substitutes, and that a tuition increase would not 
affect the decision of whether to study but affect the decision 
of where to study.
Flannery and O’Donoghue (2013) use a nested logit model 
with three choices: to attend college, to work or to work and 
study part time. They recognize two key features. First, college 
choice is a discrete choice problem where tuition and college 
quality variables are important in students’ choices. Second, 
there is a trade off between studying and working.
Other papers – such as Frenette (2009), Chowdry, Crawford, 
Dearden, Goodman, and Vignoles (2010), Spiess and Wrohlich 
(2010), among many others – investigate different aspects 
that affect college attendance. Despite the fact that all these 
papers also estimate a demand for educational institutions, 
the details of the method we employ and our goals are quite 
distinct from the others. We chose to restrict our analysis to 
business administration courses only. Implicitly, we assume that 
business administration is not a substitute with other courses, 
such as biology or engineering. Moreover, our final goal is both 
to identify the group of HEIs that invest in selectivity and to 
estimate the investment.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In the next 
section, we discuss why a HEI could use the strategy to operate 
with excess demand. Sections 3 and 4 explains the methodology 
and data employed. The results are presented in Section 5. The 
final section concludes the analysis. 
2. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
The fundamental hypothesis of Becker (1991), who studies 
the causes of excess demand in the restaurant industry, is that 
the individual’s demand depends on the other individuals’ 
demand. The author suggests that eating out, attending a 
cultural event or discussing a book are social activities in which 
people consume the product or service together, and therefore, 
the number of people sharing the same product influences the 
utility of the individual consumer.
While in Becker’s model the decision of attending a cultural 
event is a function of the queues’ size because of social aspects; 
in the present paper, the choice of a HEI depends on the HEI’s 
capacity of selecting the best students. In both situations, excess 
demand creates demand.
More specifically, in the case of higher education, we claim 
that the Becker’s argument becomes even stronger because 
both the actual quality and the reputation of a graduate course 
are functions of the quality of its students. In terms of quality 
for enrolled students, the qualification and performance of the 
cohort affect learning (the peer effect, which does not occur in 
the case of restaurants). Also the success of the graduates serves 
as signals to the market of the quality of the HEI. Therefore, 
excess demand allows HEI to select good students, who tend 
to be good graduates, which contribute to the reputation of the 
institution. Thus, in contrast with restaurants, the quality of 
enrolled students is fundamental to the choice of the potential 
students. Because greater selectivity increases the quality of the 
incoming class, we may conclude that excess demand creates 
demand, which should be considered in the maximization 
process of long-term profit. As result, the long-term equilibrium 
may present permanent excess demand.
In any market, one should expect higher demand for high-
-quality products than for low-quality products given the same 
price. However, in a “traditional” market, the equilibrium is 
reached by increasing price of high-quality products until 
eliminating excess demand.
The coexistence of HEIs with different strategies — with or 
without excess demand — can be understood using Becker’s 
model (1991). Becker (1991) does not distinguish between the 
short and long term, but his analysis corresponds to what we 
consider to be long term here.
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This differentiation seems important with respect to higher 
education because we assume that permanent excess demand 
builds the HEI’s reputation, which in turn determines its short-
-term demand curve. The idea is that, in the short term, tuition 
set below equilibrium generates excess demand (and greater 
selectivity), which, in the long term, will shift the short-term 
demand curve to the right. It happens because, in this analysis, 
each short-term curve is determined (and sustained) by a given 
level of excess demand.
For the HEI that maintains excess demand, this movement 
is sufficiently large for a given interval of prices, and 
consequently, the long-term demand curve will be positively 
inclined in this interval (Figure 1). When the price reaches a 
sufficiently high level, the large shifts in demand stop, and the 
long term demand becomes negatively sloped. In this case, the 
tuition rate that maximizes profit (P3) will be below the short 
term equilibrium price (P4).
Yet, in the case of the HEIs that do not maintain excess 
demand, the long-term demand curve will be negatively sloped 
because excess demand does not create a sufficiently large shift 
in the short term (Figure 2).
In analyzing Figure 1, an initial equilibrium in P1 is 
determined by the D1 demand and supply S. Next, an HEI 
reduces its price to P2 and creates an excess demand of ab. In 
the long term, for this excess demand, the short-term demand 
curve turns out to be D2, which allows the HEI to charge tuition 
equal to P3, while maintaining the same excess demand. Note 
that the excess demand ab generates a shift of demand curve 
(from D1 to D2), which implies a higher quantity demanded 
for P2. In order to maintain both the same excess demand (ab) 
and, consequently, D2 as the short-term demand curve, HEI 
can increase price to P3, reducing the quantity demanded to 
the previous level (Figure 1). In this step, demand is positively 
inclined.
If the HEI decides to lower the price below P3, the shift of 
short-term curve due to an increase in excess demand will be 
smaller and, as consequence, the long-term demand curve will 
be negatively inclined (from D2 to D3). In this case, the long- 
-term equilibrium will be in P3, while in the short term (only!) 
the price P4 maximizes the profits of the HEI.
Following the same sequence in Figure 2, suppose there 
is an initial equilibrium in P1. A new price P2 would create 
an excess demand for ab, which would shift the short-term 
demand curve to D2. However, in this case, long-term demand 
(d1) is negatively inclined, since any price higher than P1 
generates excess supply. Hence, the equilibrium price is the 
initial price – P1.
3. EMPIRICAL METHOD
The methodological challenge of this project, given the 
specifics of this market, is to propose estimation strategies 
through models of discrete choice and the utilization of 
instrumental variables that can surpass (at least in part) the 
econometric difficulties arising from the particularities of the 
market. These strategies are to:
• redefine the question in order to avoid the problem in which, 
in the higher education market, the student not only chooses 
the HEI but is also chosen by the HEI, and so be able to use 
the Aggregate Logit Model;
• define the demand for the HEI;
• obtain instrumental variables to correctly estimate the model.
3.1. Econometric model
The methodology used in this paper to estimate the demand 
for undergraduate business programs in the state of São Paulo 
is based on the literature of discrete choice applied to the 
Figure 2: Long-Term Equilibrium without  
Demand Excess
Figure 1: Long-Term Equilibrium with  
Demand Excess
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estimation of demand in markets with differentiated goods. 
There is a vast range of references, from the seminal work 
of Lancaster (1971) and McFadden (1974) to more recent 
contributions well known in the field, such as Berry (1994), 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (BLP, as they are referred 
to from here onward) and Nevo (2001). In this paper, we will 
use the Aggregate Logit Model(3).
This methodology has two important characteristics. The 
first of these is that despite being a model of discrete choice, 
it is based only on aggregated or market data. The second is 
that the method projects the goods (HEIs, which hereafter refer 
specifically to São Paulo business schools) in the space of 
characteristics, and the dimension of this space is the relevant 
one. In this sense, the problem of dimensionality is resolved 
when the system of demand equations for differentiated goods 
is estimated, wherein the price of all goods must appear in 
every equation.
Before describing this methodology, it is necessary to 
evaluate if it is adequate for the HEI market. Models of discrete 
choice assume that the consumer chooses the good or service. 
This assumption does not match this market, in which the 
student not only chooses the HEI but also is chosen by the 
HEI. The fact that a student goes to study at an HEI indicates 
that there was a matching between them. This interpretation 
of the process suggests that models of discrete choice are not 
appropriate for this sector.
In order to avoid this problem and be able to apply a discrete 
choice model, we redefine the question of interest. Instead 
of asking the question “at which HEI will students study”, 
we turn to the question “to which HEI will students apply”. 
Hence, instead of using the number of registered students 
as the measure of demand, we use the number of student 
applications. This approach can be understood in terms of the 
student calculating an ex ante utility of studying in a given HEI, 
before the decision of the HEI of accepting or not him as its 
student. This approach allows us to use the traditional methods 
of discrete choice to analyze this market.
The primary idea behind this method is that students classify 
HEIs according to their characteristics. We initially assume that 
the function of ex ante indirect utility that a student has upon 
applying to an HEI depends on the HEI quality (qe), the quality 
of the students that attend the HEI (e), the price of studying at 
the HEI (p) and the difficulty of being accepted to the institution 
(sel). We can then write that the utility that the student i has 
upon registering at the HEI j is represented as 
 Uij=U(qej, ej, pj, selj, εij) [1]
where εij is a non-observable characteristic of individual i in 
relation to HEI j, for example, if the HEI is close to the residence 
of i. We assume that the HEI quality depends on both observable 
characteristics (x) and non-observable characteristics (ξ), 
then qe=(x,ξ). Assuming that the utility function is linear, 
we find that the utility a student i has on choosing school j is 
represented by
 uij = αpj + γej + φselj + xj β + ξj + εij [2]
where α, γ and φ are scalars, β is a vector with dimension K, 
ξj is an unobserved characteristic of the HEI (j), and εij is a 
characteristic idiosyncratic to consumer i in relation to HEI j.
The student chooses between (N+1) options: the N different 
HEIs available in the market and the option to not study 
business (which means studying in a different higher-education 
program or no higher-education program). The utility of each 
option for the consumer is represented by the following system:
 ui0 = x0 β + ξ0 + εi0
 ui1 = αp1 + γe1 + φsel1 + x1 β + ξ1 + εi1
 ... 
[3]
 uiN = αpN + γeN + φselN + xN β + ξN + εiN
From among the available options, the student chooses the 
option that grants the best utility. We normalize the utility of the 
option of not studying business as zero, as is usual. Additionally, 
we assume that the idiosyncratic characteristic εij is distributed 
as a type I extreme value distribution, which transforms the 
problem into the well known logit(4).Then a consumer chooses 
alternative j if uij > uik , k ≠ j, k = 0, 1,... N.
If information about the choice of the consumers were 
available or if we had microdata, then this study would use 
the hypothesis of logistically distributed errors to calculate the 
probability of the consumer choosing each alternative. In that 
case, the model would be the traditional Multinomial Logit 
Model. Unfortunately, microdata on consumer choices were 
not available – only the total number of students that chose 
a determined HEI. Therefore, a model based on aggregated 
data is used. 
With this aim, we define:
 Aj (x, p, e, sel, ξ; α, β) {(εi0, εi1 ... εN) │uij ,  
 k ≠ j, k = 0, 1,... N} [4]
where x. = (x1,... xN), p. = (p1,... pN), e. = (e1,... eN), sel. = 
(sel1,... selN) and x. = (x1,... xN) are, respectively, the observable 
characteristics, the price vector, the student quality vector, 
the selectivity vector and the vector of the non-observable 
characteristics of all N HEIs existing in the market. Group Aj 
defines the group of individuals who choose alternative j. It 
is important to note that individual i is defined by vector (ei0, 
ei1 ... eiN). Aggregating all individuals i present in group Aj, 
or integrating the distribution e over group Aj, one obtain the 
market share of product j:
 sj = ∫ f (ε) dε [5]
 
Aj
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where f(.) is a density function of the extreme value distribution. 
This hypothesis on distribution means that the defined integral 
in [5] has a closed functional form, represented by the following 
equation (see Train, 2003, pp. 78 and 79 for the algebraic 
manipulation that transforms the equation from [5] to [6]):
sj =
eαpj + γej + φselj + xj β + ξj
[6]
∑k eαpk + γej + φselj + xk β + ξk
Using the log in equation [6], we reach a linear expression 
of the fraction of consumers that opt for HEI j, which is the 
model estimated in this paper: 
 ln(sj) - ln(so) = αpj + γej + φselj + xj β + ξj [7]
where sj is the market share of HEI j, and s0 is the market share 
of the option to not pursue a higher education or to undertake 
a program in an area other than business. Two points should 
be mentioned. Initially, despite the non-linearity of the initial 
problem, the hypothesis of logit distribution and the aggregation 
allowed us to reach a linear equation, which simplifies the 
estimation process.
Secondly, the non-observable characteristic (by the 
econometrists) of the HEI, x, is the random term of the estimation 
model. Observing that this term captures the characteristics of 
the HEI not included in vector x, it is intuitive to suppose that 
this term has a positive correlation with the price, the quality 
of the students and the selectivity of the HEI. HEIs with better 
non-observable characteristics in equilibrium charge higher 
prices, attract better students, and can be more selective. This 
fact generates a correlation between these variables and the 
econometric error, resulting in problems of endogeneity for all 
of them, so instrumental variables are needed to estimate the 
model. We discuss this issue in the next subsection.
Finally, with respect to the econometric technique, it is 
necessary then to use those models that permit the use of 
instrumental variables. We will use the method of two-stage 
least squares (2SLS).
3.2. Instrumental variables
According to the literature on estimating demand for 
homogeneous goods, the valid instrument to correct for the 
endogeneity of the price variable is a set of variables that affect 
business costs and are unrelated to demand shocks. In theory, 
the same type of instrument can be utilized in markets with 
differentiated goods. However, there are rare situations in which 
cost variables of firms are related to only one differentiated 
good, without being correlated with all of the market goods. 
Therefore, another type of instrument should be used.
In literature, there are two possible solutions to this problem. 
The first, derived by BLP, uses the exogenous characteristics 
of the firm’s own product as instruments for themselves and 
the sum or average of the rivals firms’ product characteristics 
as instruments for the price. According to Bertrand’s oligopoly 
model with differentiated goods, in market equilibrium, the 
better the quality of the rival goods, the lower the equilibrium 
price of the firm in question.
The second solution, introduced by Hausman (1996), 
advocates the use of the same product’s price in another market 
as an instrument for the price(5). In the problem analyzed here, 
one HEI is different from another, not having a product brand 
appearing in different markets, nor two HEIs in different 
cities. This forces us to opt for the first solution, in which we 
use the average of the characteristics of the other HEIs as an 
instrument for the price.
The quality of enrolled students and HEI selectivity are 
also endogenous variables. We will use the same group of 
instrumental variables that we use for price: competitor 
characteristics, and the age of the HEI. The age must be related 
to the reputation of the school, the hypothesis being that the 
older HEIs are more likely to have better reputations.
4. DATASET
As mentioned in the previous section, the model represented 
by equation [7] will be estimated in this work. We will explain 
the variables utilized in this estimation, as well as the source 
of the data.
At the onset, it is important to define the dependent variable 
or the market share of the HEIs (variable sj in equation [7]). 
This is equal to the ratio between the number of students that 
want to study at an HEI and the number of potential students 
in the market where the HEI is located.
To reach the market share denominator, it is necessary to 
explain a priori the markets in which the HEI participates. In 
the present work, we assume, in a simplifying manner, that each 
municipality with at least one business program corresponds to 
a market(6). At the same time, to reach the number of potential 
consumers of an HEI, the study takes into consideration the 
fact that the consumer has completed secondary education, 
is between 18 and 25 years old, and is being confronted with 
three possibilities: to attend a business program, to attend a 
higher-education program in another field or to not attend a 
higher-education program at all. All of the students who opt 
for one of these alternatives and who live in the municipality 
where the HEI is located are part of the HEI’s potential market.
The 2006 Higher Education Census from the Ministério da 
Educação e Cultura (MEC – Ministry of Education) provides 
information, by municipality, on the number of students in 
the first two options, the business program or the program in 
another field. In addition, the 2010 Population Census carried 
out by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística 
(IBGE – Brazilian Bureau of Statistics) shows that 27% of 
individuals between 18 and 25 years old who have finished 
secondary education do attend an HEI. Therefore, knowing the 
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number of students in the first two groups and the participation 
percentage of the third group, we can estimate the number of 
potential consumers, which will be the denominator of the 
market-share formula of the HEI in the municipality. This 
number is then equal to the ratio between the number of students 
enrolled in any undergraduate degree (business and others) in 
the municipality and 0.27.
It is difficult to define the numerator of the market-share 
formula of the HEI. As we discussed in the econometric model 
section, we use the number of students who take the entrance 
exam for the business program at an HEI(7), in order to avoid the 
fact that in the education sector not only the students chooses 
the HEI but also is chosen by it. We are aware that there is 
a problem with this alternative: many students take various 
exams, for different HEIs, in the same year. Thus, the average 
might overestimate the demand for the HEI.
A possible alternative is to use the number of registered 
students in the HEI business program. The problem with this 
alternative is that the HEIs that are more selective, that is, that 
have higher candidate/slots ratios, tend to work with excess 
demand. As discussed in section 2, they do not adjust the tuition 
to balance the amount demanded with the amount offered. The 
reason, as was already discussed, is that in the education sector, 
the consumer (the student) is also an input in the productive 
process. The better quality the registered students are, ceteris 
paribus, the better the quality of the students educated at the 
HEI. This occurs in large part because students can benefit from 
interacting with the other students, through what is known as 
the peer effect, and because the quality of the HEI supplies 
a signal about the quality of the graduate in the job market 
after completing higher education(8). Moreover, the HEIs with 
excess demand certainly would have a better market share if 
they were to have a less rigorous selection process and accept 
more students. Therefore, the number of registered students 
as a measure of the numerator for the market-share formula 
underestimates the demand for the HEIs with higher selectivity. 
Last but not least, with this alternative, we could not apply the 
models of discrete choice, as pointed out in the econometric 
model section. Hence, we do not consider this alternative.
The data of the number of student applicants to each HEI 
comes from the 2006 Higher Education Census of the MEC.
This study now proceeds to a discussion of the different 
observable characteristics related to the variable quality of 
the HEIs that can affect the choice of the student and are used 
as explanatory variables (variable xj 
in equation [7]) in the 
empirical model. Two variables are related to the quality of 
the faculty body: the percentage of lecturers with doctorates 
(perc_doutor) and the percentage of full-time lecturers (perc_
int). These variables are collected from the 2005 Faculty Body 
Census. At first, a high percentage of lecturers with doctorates 
and full-time lecturers might signal the quality of the program; 
however, the business student certainly is also interested in 
their lecturers’ business experience, which often competes 
with the full-time dedication of a university lecturer. Therefore, 
whether a superior title means better academic quality in the 
program (maintaining constant the rest of the variables) is 
questionable. For example, a lecturer who is also the director 
of a large company may attract more candidates to a business 
course than a full-time lecturer with a Ph.D. degree.
Other observable characteristics related to the variable 
quality of the HEIs used as explanatory variables are the ones 
related the conditions of the infrastructure offered by the HEI. 
The models in this paper consider three variables: the quality 
of the overall physical structure (qual_infra), the quality 
of the library (qual_libr) and the availability of computers 
(qual_comp). These three variables are obtained from a 
socioeconomic survey administered to undergraduate students 
during the Exame Nacional de Desempenho de Estudantes 
(Enade – National Student Performance Exam), carried out 
by the MEC and compiled at the 2006 Enade Census. The 
students grade each of these variables and an average score for 
each of those is obtained. In the case of these three physical-
-infrastructure variables, the signs of their coefficients are 
expected to be positive; that is, better infrastructure should 
correspond to a greater market share.
The authors collected pricing information during the first 
semester of 2008. A negative sign for the tuition coefficient 
is expected.
Every new undergraduate student in business (and in other 
programs as well) must take an exam that encompass specific 
and general knowledge, the Enade. The average score of the 
students in a given HEI is used in this paper as a proxy for 
the quality of the student body that the student will find if he 
chooses this HEI. This variable comes from the 2006 Enade 
Census. This variable might signify that the students take into 
account the effect of their peers (peer effect) in their choice of 
HEI. Additionally, schools with better students have a better 
reputation, generating better results for their students in the job 
market after graduation. In both cases, the higher the Enade 
score is, the more qualified the group of students and the higher 
the demand for the HEI.
The selectivity variable is defined as the number of 
candidates divided by the number of vacancies. On the one 
hand, a higher selectivity implies less likelihood that the student 
will be accepted by the HEI. Hence, we expect that this variable 
will have a negative effect on the choice of the student. On the 
other hand, this variable may be seen as another proxy for the 
quality of the student body. In this regard, the higher Enade 
score is, the higher is the demand for the HEI. Therefore, the 
sign of the coefficient of the variable selectivity is unclear from 
a theoretical point of view.
In terms of the market (municipality) in which the HEI is 
located – as identified by the 2006 Higher Education Census 
– the model includes the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita of the municipality (GDP-pc) for the year 2007, as 
obtained from Ipeadata(9). In terms of the location, a dummy 
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variable (SP) assumes the value one when the HEI is in the 
market of the capital, the city of Sao Paulo, and zero otherwise. 
As the density of business programs in relation to the total 
population is smaller in the capital than in other cities, an 
inferior market share is expected in the capital.
Our sample contains 298 observations of HEIs located 
in 130 municipalities (or markets) in Sao Paulo state. As 
previously mentioned, each market is defined as a municipality.
Table 1 shows the distribution of programs in the different 
markets. In 83 markets (municipalities), or in 63% of markets, 
there is only one undergraduate business program. Two HEIs 
share students in 25 markets, and 97 programs are distributed 
through 21 markets, each containing between 3 and 11 
competitors. Additionally, the principal market is certainly the 
municipality of Sao Paulo, where there is a concentration of 
22.8% (n=68) of all programs in the state.
Table 2 presents a statistical summary of the variables 
used in the analysis, with the average and standard deviation 
of each one. The average of the dependent variable, i.e., the 
market share, is equal to 6.9% once the total market includes 
all of the individuals of university age who have completed 
secondary school, whether enrolled in a business program or 
not. The HEIs are, on average, 9.2 years old, and practically 
all offer a bachelor’s program rather than a technical program.
The average Enade score of the registered students is 
equal to 39.5 (on a scale of 0 to 100). Considering only the 20 
programs with the highest candidate/vacancy ratios, the Enade 
average rises to 44.6.
The average tuition is equal to R$ 506,85 (or US$ 318), 
and the municipalities’ average GDP per capita is equal to 
R$ 28.750,95 (or US$ 18,082). Additionally, among the HEIs 
analyzed, the average percentage of lecturers with doctorates 
and full-time lecturers are, respectively, 8.5% and 12.5%.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the average scores of the 
variables related to the conditions of the infrastructure: the 
quality of the overall physical infrastructure, the library, and 
computer availability. The second, third and fourth columns 
present the number of programs with evaluation, respectively, 
“worse than average by one standard deviation (sd)”, “average 
± one sd”, and “better than average by one sd”.
Finally, Figure 3 summarizes the data sources.
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we show and discuss the empirical results. 
In the first part, various estimates will be presented, which vary 
according to the explanatory variables used. Here, we aim to 
explain which factors are considered by students when choosing 
a HEI. In the second part, using the coefficients estimated, the 
HEI’s investment in excess demand is calculated.
5.1. Results of the regressions
Table 4 shows the results of the different estimation models. 
Model (1) is estimated via OLS. Models (2) through (5) are 
estimates with instrumental variables (IVs) for the price, Enade 
score and selectivity via 2SLS.
As mentioned in the previous section, OLS is not the 
indicated method in this case, but we present the result of this 
estimate to highlight the effect of the instrumental variables. 
The comparison between model (1) and the others allows us 
to identify a substantial difference when we use IVs for the 
estimate of the models. In particular, the coefficients of the 
variables price, Enade and selectivity change substantially 
when the 2SLS method is employed.
For models (2) through (5), the IVs used is the average 
values of the other HEIs (the rivals) for the following 
characteristics: the percentage of lecturers with doctorates 
(ivdoc), the quality of the infrastructure (ivinstal), the quality 
of the computers (ivcomp), the quality of the library (ivbibl) 
and the percentage of full-time lecturers (ivintegr). Moreover, 
we use the age of the HEI itself as a measure of its reputation, 
which should have a direct impact on students’ choices and 
Enade scores. We observe in the correlation of variables in 
Table 1
HEI and Markets
Number of HEI Number of Markets Total
1 83 83
2 25 50
3 to 11 21 97
68 1 68
Total 130 298
Table 2
Statistical Summary
Variable Average Standard Deviation
Market Share (%) 6.9 11.2
Enade Score (0-100) 39.5 4.3
Price (R$) 506,85 249.2
Lecturers with Doctorates (%) 8.5 9.3
Full-time Lecturers (%) 12.5 15.1
GDP per capita (R$) 28.750,95 18.200,1
Age 9.2 12.2
Bachelor’s Degree Offered (%) 94.8  
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Table 3
Distribution of Quality of Physical Infrastructure
Variable Worse than average by one standard deviation
Average ± one standard 
deviation
Better than average by one 
standard deviation Total 
qual_infra 48 201 49 298
qual_comp 42 204 52 298
qual_libr 46 206 46 298
Variable Source
Population Population Census – Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE) 
Applicants and enrolled students and by IES, course 2006 Higher Education Census – Ministry of Education (MEC) 
Percentage of lecturers with doctorates and full-time lecturers 2005 Faculty Body Census – Ministry of Education (MEC)
Quality of computers, infrastructure and library 2006 ENADE (National Student Performance Exam) – Census
Average HEI quality 2007 ENADE (National Student Performance Exam) – Census
Per capita GDP in 2007 IPEADATA
Name and location of a HEI 2006 Higher Education Census – Ministry of Education (MEC) 
HEI Tuition Collected by the authors in 2008
Figure 3: Summary of Data Sources
Table 5 that the Enade scores as well as the price of the HEI 
show a correlation of around 0.3 with the age of the institution.
The results of the first stage of the models (2) through (4), 
which contains all of the variables, are presented in Appendix 
1. Importantly, some of the IVs are significant and exhibit the 
expected sign, configuring instruments that present a significant 
(conditional) correlation with the endogenous variable.
Tuition, Enade scores, and selectivity are all endogenous 
variables, and they represent the market equilibrium of the HEI. 
Some difficulties arise with this fact. First, at equilibrium, these 
variables are positively correlated: better HEIs charge a higher 
tuition, are more selective, and attract better students, implying a 
positive correlation between these three variables (see Table 5). 
Secondly, as discussed, the instruments used in the identification 
of the model are made up of the exogenous characteristics of 
the HEIs that determine the market equilibrium and, therefore, 
are the same for these three variables. In contrast, BLP uses the 
group of instruments to identify only one endogenous variable, 
instead of three in this case. 
All of these factors complicate the identification of the 
effect of these three variables, as can be observed in model (2) 
of Table 4. This specification includes all of the explanatory 
variables, including tuition, Enade scores, and selectivity. 
None of these is significant in this specification. The positive 
correlation between them complicates the correct identification 
of the parameters. To avoid this problem, we estimate the model 
with only Enade (models (3) and (5)) or selectivity (model 4) 
as the explanatory variable, apart from tuition. 
The only difference between models (3) and (5) is the 
fact that some control variables (full-time, qual_instal and 
qual_comp) are excluded in the last model. The results of 
models (3) and (5), which exclude selectivity, are similar to each 
other. The coefficients of the price variable are approximately 
-0.02, and those of the Enade score variable are approximately 
0.74. The percentage of lecturers with doctorate degrees is 
also statistically significant, with a coefficient close to 13. The 
coefficients of the other variables are also robust compared to 
the different specifications. The results in these models suggest 
the importance of the price variable for student choice.
In the case of the Enade score variable, the positive, robust, 
and significant effect shows that the students take into account 
the quality of the student body when they choose where to study. 
The primary justification for this fact is that employers on the 
job market do not perfectly observe the quality of the student 
or the recent graduate. The reputation of the student’s school 
provides a sign about his or her quality. In equilibrium, HEIs 
with more qualified students would have a better reputation 
and would signal a higher quality to the market. Thus, the 
candidates would ultimately prefer an HEI with a better 
student body(10). Another explanation for the importance of the 
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Table 5
Correlation
 MS Price Enade Selectiv Doctor Full-Time qual_inst qual_comp qual_libr Age
Ms 1.00
Price -0.21 1.00
Enade -0.14 0.60 1.00
Selectivity 0.04 0.39 0.32 1.00
Doctor -0.11 0.51 0.42 0.36 1.00
Full-Time -0.12 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.27 1.00
qual_instal -0.03 0.17 0.22 0.06 0.12 0.14 1.00
qual_comp 0.01 0.27 0.30 0.04 0.24 0.15 0.58 1.00
qual_libr 0.06 0.24 0.27 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.58 0.60 1.00
Age -0.14 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.00 0.14 0.07 1.00
Table 4
Econometric Results
(1)
OLS
(2)
2SLS
(3)
2SLS
(4)
2SLS
(5)
2SLS
Price -0.000642
(-1.07)
-0.0319
(-1.60)
-0.0192**
(-3.00)
-0.0322
(-1.55)
-0.0214**
(-2.96)
Enade 0.0199
(0.65)
0.0888
(0.09)
0.736*
(2.15)
0.770*
(2.13)
Selectivity
0.369***
(4.35)
6.314
(0.89)
6.742
(1.26)
Doctorates -0.366
(-0.27)
4.776
(0.33)
12.06*
(2.14)
4.247
(0.30)
13.20*
(2.14)
Full-time
0.602
(0.84)
-7.175
(-0.91)
-1.111
(-0.61)
-7.466
(-0.99)
qual_instal
-0.346
(-1.18)
-0.795
(-0.56)
-0.665
(-1.01)
-0.789
(-0.52)
qual_comp
-0.502
(-0.80)
7.937
(0.77)
-0.808
(-0.55)
8.580
(1.14)
qual_libr
0.491
(1.12)
0.745
(0.27)
1.929
(1.70)
0.667
(0.24)
1.242
(1.08)
saopaulo
-4.599***
(-17.11)
0.251
(0.07)
-2.568**
(-2.64)
0.413
(0.12)
-2.209*
(-2.06)
GDP-pc
-0.00575
(-0.43)
0.0654
(0.81)
0.0294
(0.92)
0.0670
(0.82)
0.0329
(0.94)
_cons
-4.551**
(-3.03)
11.35
(0.24)
-23.25
(-1.86)
15.28
(1.18)
-22.55
(-1.79)
N 298 298 298 298 298
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. 
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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quality of the student body on the choice of the applicant has 
to do with what the literature calls the peer effect. This effect 
consists of the positive externality that qualified colleagues 
have on the learning process. In other words, studying and 
living with intelligent and studious individuals contributes to 
the student’s ability to learn. For this reason, the quality of the 
students in the HEI affects the decision of the applicants(11). 
With the available data, it is not possible to define which of 
the alternatives better explains the decision to take the entrance 
exam; we limit ourselves to the conclusion that students have 
a preference for better peers. 
In model (4), in comparison with model (2), we exclude the 
variable Enade. The variable “selectivity” is not statistically 
different from zero. As we mentioned before, this variable 
captures two effects. On the one hand, a higher selectivity 
implies less likelihood that the student will be accepted by the 
HEI and a negative sign is expected. On the other hand, this 
variable is a proxy for the quality of the student body, and a 
positive sign is expected. The empirical result suggests that 
the net effect is zero.
In Table 4, we still observe that the percentage of full-time 
lecturers shows is not significant in all models, similar to the 
coefficients for computer access and infrastructure quality. 
Business students might prefer to take classes with lecturers 
who are professionals in the market, and therefore part-time at 
the HEI, rather than with lecturers with a full time academic 
profession. This may explain the non-significance of the 
percentage of full-time lecturers in the students’ choice.
The percentage of lecturers with doctorates, in contrast, 
seems to be a relevant variable to the student decision-making 
process. This variable has a positive value and is statistically 
significant in all of the estimate specifications via IVs that do 
not include selectivity. Taken together, the results obtained by 
the characteristics of the faculty – the percentage of lecturers 
with doctorates and the percentage of full-time lecturers – 
indicates that students take into account faculty quality, but that 
lecturers do not need to be academics in the traditional sense, 
i.e., dedicated solely to research and teaching.
The quality variables of the HEI are not significant. A 
possible cause for this is the high correlation that exists 
between them, close to 0.6 (Table 5). For this reason, we 
remove infrastructure quality and computer access from the 
specification (5) of the model, but the results do not change 
substantially. The quality of the library coefficient continues 
to be non-significant in this specification.
Aside from the variables mentioned, we include controls 
for characteristics of the counties: GDP per capita and a 
dummy for the city of São Paulo. We believe that the São 
Paulo dummy makes the value of the price coefficient more 
accurate. Without this differentiation, the regression might 
overestimate the impact of price because the correlation 
between lower tuition and greater participation in the market 
might be partially explained not by a causal relationship but 
by the fact that these characteristics are typical in the markets 
of smaller cities. Yet, the programs in the city of San Paulo, a 
city with a higher cost of living, tend to have smaller market 
shares, since the market-share denominator is the number of 
potential applicants, which is enormous for the São Paulo’s 
market. Therefore, the higher prices of the São Paulo programs 
and their smaller market share might intensify the impact of 
prices on the market-share, if the regression were not to include 
a dummy for the city of São Paulo. The interpretation seems 
clear: the programs in the city of São Paulo tend to present 
a market share smaller than the others and are, on average, 
more expensive (R$ 663,9 or US$ 417 in the capital versus R$ 
460,3 or US$ 289 in the other cities). Therefore, if we had not 
controlled for location (capital versus countryside), we would 
have created an overestimation of the importance of the price 
in the determination of the market share.
5.2. Estimation of the “investment” in excess demand
According to the results presented in the prior section, one 
can estimate the total volume of revenue that a specific HEI 
gives up by maintaining a lower tuition in order to generate 
excess demand and, therefore, selectivity of the applicants for 
the business program. The procedure is simple. Using the price 
coefficient estimated in the previous section, one can calculate 
the necessary price increase that would reduce the HEI market 
share in order to eliminate the excess demand. In other words, 
the price increase that would make the number of applicants 
equal to the number of offered slots. The amount of revenues 
that the HEI gives up is equal to the difference between the 
price that would eliminate the excess demand and the actual 
price charged multiplied by the number of slots available.
Before presenting the results, a methodological procedure 
deserves mention. This estimation should be made only for the 
HEI that has a number of offered spaces lower than the number 
of applicants, which is a condition necessary but not sufficient 
for the characterization of excess demand. Furthermore, the 
applicants should fill all of the spaces because some institutions 
present a number of applicants greater than the number of slots 
but without all the slots being filled, which does not allow 
us to identify excess demand. Therefore, it is important that 
there are no unfilled slots. However, in some cases, the HEIs 
present an applicant/vacancy ratio much greater than one, but 
only one or two spaces are not filled. Clearly, in this case, the 
unfilled space is not a consequence of demand scarcity for the 
program but simply an operational question or a registration 
cancellation. For this reason, we considered programs with a 
number of applicants greater than the total number of vacancies 
and with at least 98% of the slots occupied.
Figure 4 present the amount of revenues that the HEIs give 
up in order to operate with excess demand. The calculation is 
done using the price coefficient estimated in model 3. This is the 
model chosen because the variables “Enade” and “Price” have 
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significant coefficients and all control variables are present. The 
values correspond to the annual revenue that the HEI gives up 
in the year 2006 with regard to the first-year class.
There are 39 HEIs with excess demand, and the value of the 
“lost” revenue is presented for each HEI in a growth curve. In 
model 3, 39 HEIs in the state of Sao Paulo gives up, in the short 
term, a total of R$ 5.499 million (or US$ 3,458 million) per year 
by “investing” in the selectivity of their students. Considering 
the 39 HEIs with excess demand, this amount corresponds to 
7.6% of the total revenue coming from a freshman class.
6. CONCLUSION
This article analyzes the private higher education sector 
and attempts to explain and quantify some particularities of 
this sector, such as the strategy of some institutions to maintain 
permanent excess demand and the strong segmentation 
that exists in this market. To achieve this objective, various 
peculiarities in this sector had to be taken into account in the 
analysis, requiring specific theoretical and empirical treatment, 
which we explain throughout the paper.
On the empirical part, there are two aspects that make the 
analysis more complex. First, the HEI’s market is a matching 
market, which consists of students choosing the HEI as well 
as the HEI selecting the students. To avoid this problem, we 
changed the student’s question from “at which HEI to study” 
to “at which HEI to apply.” Instead of using the number of 
registered students as a measure of demand, we use the number 
of applicants in the selection process. This avoids the problem 
of the matching market because the application precedes the 
HEI’s selection process.
The second difficulty results from the fact that some 
variables that determine the decision of the student are 
endogenous, such as tuition, quality of the student body and the 
HEI’s selectivity. These variables are determined by the market 
equilibrium, so that there is no causal relationship between them 
and the firm’s market share. We use the solution proposed by 
BLP, using the characteristics of the competitors, in addition 
to the age of the HEI itself, as instruments for the endogenous 
variables of the model.
Using data from all business-administration programs in 
the state of São Paulo, the study shows that the most relevant 
factors for student choice are the tuition charged by the 
institution and the quality of the lecturers and students. The 
other characteristics, such as the quality of the infrastructure 
or computer access, are shown to be insignificant. In a general 
way, we found evidence that the tuition and quality of both 
lecturers and the student body define an institution and its 
position in the market.
Besides estimating the importance of some HEI 
characteristics for students’ choices, this paper estimates 
the indirect HEI’s investment on student quality. As already 
Figure 4: HEI Total Investment in Excess Demand by Year and Applying Class (Model 2)
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mentioned, the empirical strategy is to measure the revenue 
amount that HEIs give up to be able to select the best students. 
As far as we know, estimating the investment on student quality 
– which means higher peer effect and better graduates – by 
using the methodology proposed here, is quite new.
The results show that, among the small group of 39 HEIs 
with positive investment, the total amount is significant only 
for very few of them. Instead of dividing the business courses 
into two groups – with positive and zero investment on student 
selection – the results suggest the existence of three groups: (1) 
HEIs with no investment; (2) HEIs with very small investment; 
and (3) HEIs with significant investment. It is hard to think 
of HEIs of the second group as institutions really willing to 
invest on student quality; rather the excess demand seems to be 
occasional. Therefore, of the total of 298 courses, only three or 
four institutions – depending on the criterion chosen – invest 
on the quality of their students.
It is worth examining the possible strategies for those 
courses of the first and second groups that do not invest on 
selection. One strategy is to reduce costs as much as possible so 
that they can attract students by reducing prices. An alternative 
strategy would be to invest on both physical resources (modern 
labs and equipments) and hiring good lecturers. However, in 
this market, as mentioned, the demanders (students) can be 
understood as input and complementary to physical resources 
and lecturers. As HEIs of the first and second groups do not 
invest on student quality, one should expect that the return of 
their investment on any other input will be lower than the return 
of the investment made by a selective HEI.
This scenario suggests that the market of business courses 
in Brazil is, in fact, composed by only two types of HEIs: those 
that invest zero or little on selection – more than 95% – and 
compete by reducing costs and prices, with little attention on 
quality; and those – three or four institutions – that invest on 
quality and reputation.
Surely, the present study does not attempt to exhaust the 
subject; rather, the idea is to open topics for further research 
that may answer important questions that were not central to 
the objective of this article. The demand estimated in the first 
section, using cross-sectional data, with an observation on 
each institution, corresponds to what we consider throughout 
the article to be short-term demand. A new investigation that 
estimated the size of external diffusion (network externality) 
in the higher-education sector would be extremely valuable. 
Additionally, alternative solutions from the point of view of 
econometric methodology might also be tested.
(1) The exchange rate used in this paper is R$ 1,59 to 
buy one dollar, of June 14th, 2011.
(2) 24.1% of the HEIs in the country are located in São 
Paulo, and the field of business is the largest in terms 
of number of programs (7.6% of the total) and number 
of registered students (13.9% of total students).
(3) A substantial part of this literature is devoted to 
overcome the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA) feature of the logit model [see Train (2003) for 
a discussion about IIA]. It is not a source of concern 
here, since we are not interested in estimating cross-
-elasticities or substitution patterns among HEIs.
(4) It is worth noting that what is relevant is the utility 
difference among the schools. The random variable 
formed by the difference between two random 
variables with extreme value distribution follows a 
logistic distribution (see Train, 2003).
(5) For a discussion of the pros and cons of each kind 
of instrument, see Nevo (2001).
(6) An alternative would be to define the market in terms 
of economic regions of different municipalities. 
However, a certain amount of arbitrariness would be 
necessary to define these alternative market borders. 
Another alternative would be to consider the city 
of São Paulo as more than one market because of 
its size. Again, it would be difficult to define the 
boundaries of this market. Next, we will propose 
models that seek to capture the specificity of the 
São Paulo market.
(7) In Brazil, all applicants to a given HEI must take 
an entrance exam.
(8) See Winston and Zimmerman (2003) for a summary 
of the literature on the peer effect and MacLeod and 
Urquiola (2009) on the effect of the reputation of 
the school on the quality of the students.
(9) See <www.ipeadata.gov.br>.
(10) MacLeod and Urquiola (2009) formalize this 
argument.
(11) Epple and Romano (1998) develop a model 
of competition between schools, where the peer 
effect is the key factor in the division of schools 
by quality.
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Permanent demand excess as business strategy: an analysis of the Brazilian  
higher-education market
Many Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) establish tuition below the equilibrium price to generate permanent de-
mand excess. This paper first adapts Becker’s (1991) theory to understand why the HEIs price in this way. The fact 
that students are both consumers and inputs on the education production  process gives rise to a market equilibrium 
where some firms have excess demand and charge high prices, and others charge low prices and have empty seats. 
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Second, the paper analyzes this equilibrium empirically. We estimated the demand for undergraduate courses in 
Business Administration in the State of São Paulo. The results show that tuition, quality of incoming students and 
percentage of lecturers  holding doctorates degrees are the determining factors of students’ choice. Since the student 
quality determines the demand for a HEI,  it is calculated what the value is  for a HEI to get better students; that is 
the total revenue that each HEI gives up to guarantee excess demand. Regarding the “investment” in selectivity, 39 
HEIs in São Paulo give up a combined R$ 5 million (or US$ 3.14 million) in revenue per year per freshman class, 
which means 7.6% of the revenue coming from a freshman class.
Keywords:  higher education, market segmentation, excess demand.
Exceso de demanda permanente como estrategia de mercado: un análisis del mercado  
brasileño de educación superior
Muchas instituciones de educación superior (IES) establecen precios para sus cursos más bajos que el precio de equi-
librio de mercado con el fin de crear exceso de demanda. Inicialmente, en este estudio, se adapta la teoría de Becker 
(1991) para entender ese comportamiento de las IES. El hecho de que los estudiantes sean a la vez consumidores e 
insumo en la función de producción de educación lleva a un equilibrio de mercado, en que algunas IES determinan 
altos precios y trabajan con exceso de demanda, y otras colocan precios bajos y siguen con plazas no ocupadas. Se 
analiza dicho equilibrio empíricamente y se estima la demanda por cursos de Administración de Empresas en el es-
tado de São Paulo. Los resultados indican que el precio, la calidad de los estudiantes ingresantes y el porcentaje de 
profesores que poseen doctorado son los factores que determinan cuál IES los estudiantes escogerán. Así, dado que 
la calidad de los estudiantes determina la demanda por una IES, se calcula el valor, para una IES, de tener mejores 
estudiantes. Dicho valor es igual a los ingresos que deja de recibir para mantener exceso de demanda y selección 
de estudiantes. Con relación a la inversión en selección de estudiantes, 39 IES en el estado de São Paulo dejaron de 
recibir ingresos de aproximadamente cinco millones de reales al año por grupo de estudiantes ingresantes, lo que 
equivale al 7,6% de los ingresos de un grupo de ingresantes.
Palabras clave: enseñanza superior, segmentación de mercado, efecto de pares.
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APPENDIX I
First-Stage Regressions
ivregress 2sls y (price Enade score selectivity = ivdoc ivintegr ivinstal ivcomp ivbibl idade) lecturers with doctorates full-time 
lecturers qual _instal qual_comp qual_libr São Paulo GDP, first.
Number of obs = 298
F(13,  284) = 17.13
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.4394
Adj R-squared = 0.4138
Root MSE = 190.7078
Price Coef. Std. Err. t P>t   [95% Conf. Interval]
doctorate 1008.407 134.3834 7.5 0.000 743.8932 1272.921
full-time -54.1632 80.72751 -0.67 0.503 -213.0634 104.737
qual_instal -27.56862 32.68935 -0.84 0.400 -91.91277 36.77554
qual_comp 76.03494 67.64821 1.12 0.262 -57.12057 209.1904
qual_libr 135.4646 47.90007 2.83 0.005 41.18042 229.7488
saopaulo -707.8994 362.8459 -1.95 0.052 -1422.108 6.30914
GDP 2.02062 1.47984 1.37 0.173 -0.8922256 4.933466
ivdoc -274.127 94.74874 -2.89 0.004 -460.6259 -87.6281
ivintegr 68.2894 58.28421 1.17 0.242 -46.43444 183.0132
ivinstal -46.37654 25.04962 -1.85 0.065 -95.68302 2.929934
ivcomp 56.59547 41.48354 1.36 0.174 -25.05873 138.2497
ivbibl -22.91079 35.69463 -0.64 0.521 -93.17039 47.34881
idade 1.587884 0.996742 1.59 0.112 -0.3740543 3.549823
_cons 621.7086 91.41559 6.8 0.000 441.7705 801.6467
Number of obs = 298
F(13,  284) = 10.13
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.3204
Adj R-squared = 0.2893
Root MSE = 3.643
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Enade Coef. Std. Err. t P>t   [95% Conf. Interval]
doctorate 12.09247 2.567086 4.71 0.000 7.039544 17.1454
full-time 1.740024 1.542114 1.13 0.260 -1.295399 4.775447
qual_instal 0.0823146 0.624455 0.13 0.895 -1.146833 1.311462
qual_comp 1.894934 1.292264 1.47 0.144 -0.6486966 4.438564
qual_libr 1.982027 0.915021 2.17 0.031 0.1809435 3.78311
Saopaulo 2.256302 6.931338 0.33 0.745 -11.38701 15.89962
GDP 0.0204556 0.028269 0.72 0.470 -0.0351876 0.076099
ivdoc -5.75277 1.809957 -3.18 0.002 -9.315403 -2.19014
ivintegr 0.7415933 1.113386 0.67 0.506 -1.449942 2.933129
ivinstal -0.5083176 0.478516 -1.06 0.289 -1.450205 0.433569
ivcomp -0.3936111 0.792448 -0.5 0.620 -1.953427 1.166205
ivbibl 0.5855984 0.681864 0.86 0.391 -0.7565499 1.927747
idade 0.040099 0.019041 2.11 0.036 0.0026207 0.077577
_cons 43.66687 1.746285 25.01 0.000 40.22956 47.10417
Number of obs = 298
F(13,  284) = 5.1
Prob > F = 0
R-squared = 0.1892
Adj R-squared = 0.1521
Root MSE = 1.2611
Selectivity Coef. Std. Err. t P>t  [95% Conf. Interval]
doctorate 4.300412 0.888617 4.84 0.000 2.5513 6.049524
full-time 0.9045524 0.533815 1.69 0.091 -0.1461836 1.955288
qual_instal -0.03066 0.21616 -0.14 0.887 -0.4561392 0.394819
qual_comp -0.9940431 0.447328 -2.22 0.027 -1.874541 -0.11355
qual_libr 0.6006139 0.316742 1.9 0.059 -0.0228455 1.224073
Saopaulo -1.602265 2.399338 -0.67 0.505 -6.325007 3.120478
GDP 0.0016438 0.009786 0.17 0.867 -0.0176175 0.020905
ivdoc -1.240264 0.626531 -1.98 0.049 -2.473497 -0.00703
ivintegr -0.0840831 0.385408 -0.22 0.827 -0.8427007 0.674535
ivinstal -0.171523 0.165642 -1.04 0.301 -0.4975647 0.154519
ivcomp 0.2393273 0.274312 0.87 0.384 -0.3006156 0.77927
ivbibl -0.1370188 0.236033 -0.58 0.562 -0.6016142 0.327577
idade 0.008284 0.006591 1.26 0.210 -0.0046894 0.021257
_cons 0.2189698 0.604491 0.36 0.717 -0.9708805 1.40882
